Why the Royal Navy Must Be Our Priority

As Europe faces a reckoning with defence posture, that it has with such eagerness avoided, the reflection of NATO in updating its defence posture presents an opportunity to change course from the abysmal pig-headed dismissal which has characterised defence since the end of the cold war, but equally a risk of huge pitfalls in taking the wrong lessons. The UK must be no exception, and despite our extraordinary leadership role since with Operations Orbit, Interflex, Cabrit, etc, and being part of the four new battlegroups for the Enhanced forward Presence, and hitting 2.3%, was left with a £29bn shortfall this patently represents a failure to grapple with the scale challenge...

The December 2022 RUSI report, that stocks would only last a week war, and was “woefully deficient”, and Alastair Cairns’ comment that the British Army would be exhausted in 6 months of full scale war, rightly highlighted the scope of issues. The Army itself only met 63% of its recruitment target in the year 2024/2025, compared to 60% for the Royal Navy and 70% for the RAF, complied with 5.5Bbn cost of delays in the Ajax Programme by 2023, having had 1200 capability requirements added and delivered 6 vehicles after a mere decade.

Clearly, despite many success stories, UK defence is trying to do far too much, with much too little. Despite amongst others in recent years, the Defence Equipment plan 2022-2032, the Integrated review, the Integrated review refresh, The Defence command paper 2023 and its subsequent refresh, this cowardly labour government have not been discouraged from their penchant for reviews to defer action. At least on Defence, the case for yet another review does appear rather thin.

Whilst the 3% target remains an insufficient long-term goal, there are some decisions that no review will ever have the capacity or remit to direct. Ultimately, wholesale strategic overhaul is not within the scope of the Strategic defence review. If the UK, and Europe more widely, wish to maintain of semblance of the national model with high welfare spending with low defence spending, we must all recognise a basic fact.

It is always the most perilous danger when adapting defence posture, to hark back to the past and nostalgic view, which may not translate into the digital age. But it remains no less an equally grave peril to ignore it completely. If we wish to retain the present alliance on modest increases in the short to medium term alongside the welfare state, each NATO nation must specialize and focus investment and defence procurement where it has competitive advantage. We can no longer be a Jack of all trades, ending up with the worst of all worlds.

Of course, we must not neglect any military branches, but that cannot be mutually exclusive with directing limited resources to key strategic assets. For the UK, that answer can have no doubt. It is the Royal Navy, that for centuries has been the safeguard of this extraordinary island nation. Of the five domains of War, only Sea has 80% of global trade passing through it. That itself is concentrated on chokepoints, such that we now have the Houthis by the Gulf of Aden Where 12-15% of global trade passes, and estimates of between 20-30% of container shipping passing through, and 60% of global trade through the SCS, whose troubles need no repeating. Add to that the increasing imperative to face a clash in the Baltic Sea, as unlike the cold war the Baltic Sea is now contested, having been a safe Russian Backyard for centuries, with a Baltic Fleet dating back to 1703 with 43 service ships, and the Baltic has vast, vulnerable underwater infrastructure which has already been targeted.

The exclave of Kaliningrad, with handy ballistic missiles on site for the occasional firefight, is now surrounded by 8 NATO allies, and whilst it is absolutely right that we stand up to dictators, and operate some modest containment strategy to limit Russian Excursion to the Atlantic Ocean, we must beware the risks as 57% of Russian Oil exports leave from the Baltic. More broadly, this all ties in to our strategic interest in the Atlantic Ocean in supporting trading with our single largest partner in the US. Add to that Piracy in the Horn of Africa having seen a resurgence, vital as the alternative trading route significantly increases cost for British consumers, both by geographical length and security risks.

This argument is not to dismiss the courage, the honour, the service and most crucially, invaluable strategic need for a strong Army and RAF, especially the later given aerial developments. Nor is it to hark back calling for the role the Royal Navy once proudly played on the world stage. It is to recognise that for this island, our first defence and our last defence are the ships of the Royal Navy. For all that Cyber expansion and Aerial travel have brought to the world, maritime remains the dominant domain.

Let us recall the words of Sir Raleigh, “For whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself”, and this rings as true today as it has since as far back as when Actium decided the fate of Rome, or when victory at Salamis forced the Persian empire to retreat, or Tsushima decided the fate of the Russo-Japanese War or Indeed throughout the illustrious history of the Royal Navy itself from Saint-Mathieu, to Cape St Vincent, Jutland and the Falklands. It is perhaps even more true in the age of global trade as the basis of cheap consumer goods.

Beyond merely a national security case, the economic case for investment in the Navy is without question. The Queen Elizabeth may have cost £3bn each, but they supported vast supply chains, over 700 businesses, and 10,000 jobs in critical and advancing sectors. Similarly, investment in nuclear carriers could be a boon to the nuclear civilian sector, not merely supporting economic growth, but simultaneously boost energy security. Besides, if the French Have them, we ought to bloody well get them too. Simply put, the direct return on investment from Navy Ships is larger and broader than investment in the other Branches, providing both an injection of cash by raising demand and placing a vote of confidence in British Industry, whilst boosting employment and upskilling the labour force, helping tackle the 9 million economically inactive people. If the government is seeking growth, it need not look far.

If the leaked proposal for the upcoming strategic defence review about cuts to British army manpower and equipment are indeed true, it will be a bitter pill, and clearly in the long term requires a vast reversal. But more fundamentally, if we must live within our means in the defence of the realm, as we always must, at least in the short term, we have to prioritise resources to the linchpin of our security.

For eons the Royal Navy has been our guardian in our darkest hours, and whether closer to home in the English Channel, the Atlantic, or further afield in the Baltic, Suez Canal and South China Sea, the maritime domain remains the defining cornerstone of security for the UK and the World. The case is abundantly clear that the upcoming Strategic defence review must see the Royal Navy as the primary beneficiary of any cuts, and irrespective of its outcome, the UK must sharpen its focus on maritime capability development to defend its strategic interests. We neglect it at our peril.

By Eitan Godsi, CFAF Member