As the Ukrainian counteroffensive continues, the slow progress has been of criticised by Western officials. The shortcomings of the Ukrainian Western trained forces clearer and clearer. Of these, the most blatant is the development of small scale ISR capabilities and offensive ordinance– most notably drones. RUSI estimated losses of 10,000 drones a month by the Ukrainians, and a recent FT article raising this, cited a former Ukrainian Minister of Defence who claimed a 100-fold increase in small scale drone production was necessary...

As the Ukrainian counteroffensive continues, the slow progress has been of criticised by Western officials. The shortcomings of the Ukrainian Western trained forces clearer and clearer. Of these, the most blatant is the development of small scale ISR capabilities and offensive ordinance– most notably drones. RUSI estimated losses of 10,000 drones a month by the Ukrainians, and a recent FT article raising this, cited a former Ukrainian Minister of Defence who claimed a 100-fold increase in small scale drone production was necessary.

At the frontline, from battalion to company to platoon to section, the use of small-scale drones and UAVs, some military, but primary civilian have redefined and revolutionised warfare. An early report of a teenager spotting a Russian tank column with a single cheap drones was striking in the precedent it set. Naturally, this development in small scale ISR and offensive drone capability has been taken up by both sides, and it is arguably the most prominent development in modern warfare since radio communication.

Now seems the time to reflect upon this and integrate this key capability across our armed forces. The case for drone training to join essential parts of basic training such as Navigation, First aid and CIS, is more compelling than ever. Despite a host of pledges in the Defence command paper and integrated review and refresh, there has been no specific pledge or suggestion to fully integrate drone warfare into the syllabus. This war has shown that little is unseen on the battlefield, and no manoeuvre can remain hidden, whether infantry or armour.

If NATO forces do not rapidly learn, they will face difficulty in any large-scale operation or movement. This may be partially negated by air superiority, but it would be foolish to allow Russian forces to maintain a tactical advantage, as they have developed doctrine and experience of drone use, especially in the current Ukrainian counteroffensive. Our present drone integration is woefully inadequate and reflective of poor procurement practise.

 As of September 2023, only the 32^nd Regiment Royal artillery was equipped with mini UAVs. Primarily, Lockhead Martin Desert Hawk 3 drones for which it paid £70 million for 229 with full support, with a mere 10k radius. One fine example of a low-cost civilian drone which can be purchased for as little as £1.5K to £10K, is the Mavic 3 Drone. This widely available civilian drone, capturing 1020p with a 15km radius, is one example collected by Ukrainian NGO Centre of assistance to the army, veterans and their armies, anddonated to frontline units. Cheaper models like this would be instrumental in supplementing expensive models as a force multiplier. It would be sheer madness not to recognise the military potential for this, and relative cost efficiency compared with models like the stalker VXE30 or Indago 4, which will be difficult to buy in the necessary quantity but should be used concurrently. Indeed, it featured prominently in Mark Urbans recent compelling Newsnight report from the frontline showcasing the offensive capabilities.

It would be prudent to have widely integrated drone practise, especially in the infantry. The use could be for both stationary and mobile units, for instance allowing a convoy in a contested area to scout the surrounding area as it moves or providing better warning before an ambush on a FOB. Therefore, a low cost ISR capability could augment the existing NATO advantage in satellite technology, by providing higher quality real time information.

Whenever a company or section advances with good air visibility, it would be invaluable for small units to conduct independent ISR, detect enemy dispositions and allow for a more accurate relay of information from battalion to corps HQ, and these advantages would be all the more powerful in a counter insurgency scenario. With every soldier having basic knowledge, and a specialist drone squad in each company, the British army could develop an invaluable tactical advantage, which we forfeit if we allow Russian drone doctrine to develop without matching it. Whilst in the short term drone use would primarily serve ISR, the development of offensive capabilities by attaching explosive payloads and eliminating enemy vehicles, which has already proven deadly in Ukraine, is a clear area for long term capability enhancement.

Implementing basic drone training over three days at Catterick ITC, integrated into the wider CIS programme, would be relatively low cost, and yet provide an essential improvement in future capability development. A specialist drone squad to provide independent, localised ISR capability in every company, should be required to pass military aviation authority standards to operate more expensive UAVs, with cheaper models distributed more widely. A single regiment with expensive military models will clearly be laughably insufficient in the event of conflict, yet despite much discussion of drone use in the war there has remained no suggestion or commitment to widescale implementation of this technology, despite high-cost efficiency.

The Ministry of Defence should work with the Defence sector to identify a suitable low-cost model which could be mass produced, perhaps based on civilian models like the Mavic 3, alongside a smaller quantity of expensive military models. Defence has many spending demands, but this is becoming a definitive technology in modern attritional war and is undoubtedly cost-effective. Perhaps it is time we invited some Ukrainian drone pilots to teach our own forces and inform doctrine. The case seems compelling for inclusion of drone training as a basic military skill, and though we strive for peace, it would be imprudent, short sighted and foolhardy to resist the clear advantages this new technology has demonstrated in the present war, both by involving it in basic training and developing doctrine to incorporate it into combined arms warfare.

By Eitan Godsi, CFAF Member