How Finland’s Entrance into NATO Benefits Member States

On 18th May 2023, Finland’s accession to NATO was confirmed. This came one year after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, as well as initial vetoes from Turkey and Hungary. While vetoes for Sweden’s accession remain in place, it is believed that these objections will be lifted.

The entry of NATO is an unprecedented, but logical, step for Finland, a country that had previously aimed to promote a neutral foreign policy towards Russia. Finland and Russia share a 1300 km border with each other. This border is sparsely populated, difficult to patrol and considered difficult to defend. The Finnish border also has a proximity to key Russian cities, most notably being within 150km of St Petersburg, the former capital of the Russian Empire and the birthplace of Vladimir Putin...

These geographic facts are the key reason behind the historical enmity between the two states. To understand the reasons behind Finland’s desire to join NATO, it is necessary to gain historical background on the conflicts between Finland and Russia. The first conflict over the land to become the state of Finland occurred in 1808, during the reign of Alexander I over the Russian Empire. Finland, then controlled by Sweden and an ally of the United Kingdom against Napoleonic France, was invaded by Russia in order to gain control of Finnish ports and to move the Swedish-Russian frontier away from St Petersburg. Within a year, Russia has overrun the entire country and annexed the country from Sweden.

Finland remained a vassal state of the Russian Empire until 1917, when the country left the then Soviet Union and established an independent state. However, the country was subsequently invaded in 1940, following the Molotov Ribbentrop pact and ceded the city of Vyborg within Karelia, then the second largest city in Finland. Following the Winter War, this change in territory was later ratified in 1944.

As a result of the fragile state of peace between the two powers, Finland chose to maintain a policy of neutrality, with the country refusing Marshall Aid funding in 1948. A poll conducted in March 2014, following the Russian annexation of Crimea, found that only 22% of Finland’s adult populace favoured joining NATO. This changed on 24th February 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with Finland beginning the constitutional process of joining on 15th May 2022.

While pursuing a policy of neutrality following 1944, Finland developed and retains an active defence strategy with the purpose of deterring future Russian aggression. This included a mandatory period of up to 347 days of national service, implemented during the Cold War and remaining in place today. The policy continues to have a high approval, with an approval rating of 73% as of February 2022.

Finland also boasts the ability to mobilise approximately 300,000 active personnel and an additional 900,000 reserves, more than the combined reserves of Italy, Germany and France. The Army also possesses 1500 artillery pieces, and the Air Force also purchased 64 F-35 fighter jets from the United States in February 2022.

Because of these decisions, Finland’s Military has proved to be aligned to the model of other NATO states. Finland’s investment into national security has resulted in the process of accession to NATO being relatively straight forward, and will provide numerous benefits to several other NATO states. These benefits would be further enhanced through Sweden’s accession.

Both Finland and Sweden have an active Defence manufacturing industry, with Saab serving as a producer of advanced fighter jets and guiding systems. Saab also produces the N4 Anti Tank Missile, a variant of which is used by the US Army.

In regard to Naval and Air considerations, it is important to note that the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet operates from St Petersburg and Kaliningrad. The entrance of Finland, and eventually Sweden, would result in the Baltic Sea effectively being surrounded entirely by NATO states. The cooperation in intelligence, combined with the shallow Baltic Sea, would deny the Russian submarine fleet the ability to move undetected.

Finland, alongside Norway’s, presence on the Arctic Circle also enables an early warning detection against the Russian Northern Fleet, which includes 20 submarines that sail from Severomorsk and Murmansk. Finland’s presence also ensures that the gap between Norway and Russia would be more easily defended, and diversifies the available air bases along the Arctic circle..

Moreover, Finland is geographically well suited to provide air and naval supply to the Baltic States, with Helsinki being within 80 km of Tallinn. This provides a sound alternative to supplying through the 65km wide Suwalki gap, flatland that lies between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus, and the only land corridor between Poland and Lithuania. In the event of a Swedish accession to NATO, the Island of Gotland could serve a similar purpose.

In regard to land considerations, Finland’s border with Russia remains in proximity to the highly militarised Kola Peninsula. This peninsula holds a large amount of Russia’s ICBM stockpile and air bases. The R21, the only highway in use to supply Murmansk from St Petersburg is approximately 100 km from the border. Finland’s accession grants scope for improved intelligence on Russian activity in the region.

While these present tangible benefits to NATO, the scale and speed of these benefits will vary based on the extent of Finland’s cooperation. It is believed that Finland will follow Norway’s example at present, opting to not allow permanent NATO bases within it’s territory.

By Tom Inman, CFAF Member